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Abstract:  Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity
preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold inter-regional claims
on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no
aggregate uncertainty, the first-best allocation of risk sharing can be achieved. However, this
arrangement is financially fragile. A small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread
by contagion throughout the economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the
completeness of the structure of interregional claims. Complete claims structures are shown
to be more robust than incomplete structures.
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There is a long tradition of regarding dislocation in the ¯nancial sector as
a cause of economic °uctuations (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke
(1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). According to this view, ¯nancial crises
are important because they raise the costs of intermediation and restrict
credit, which in turn restrain the level of activity in the real sector and
ultimately can lead to periods of low growth and recession.
The prevalence of ¯nancial crises has led many to conclude that the ¯-
nancial sector is unusually susceptible to shocks. One theory is that small
shocks, which initially only a®ect a few institutions or a particular region of
the economy, spread by contagion to the rest of the ¯nancial sector and then
infect the larger economy. In this paper, we focus on one channel of conta-
gion, the overlapping claims that di®erent regions or sectors of the banking
system have on one another. When one region su®ers a bank crisis, the other
regions su®er a loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value.
If this spillover e®ect is strong enough, it can cause a crisis in the adjacent
regions. In extreme cases, the crisis passes from region to region and becomes
a contagion.
In order to focus on the role of one particular channel for ¯nancial conta-
gion, we exclude other propagation mechanisms that may be important for
a fuller understanding of ¯nancial contagion. In particular, we assume that
agents have complete information about their environment. Incomplete in-
formation may create another channel for contagion. If a shock in one region
serves as a signal predicting a shock in another region, then a crisis in one
region may create a self-ful¯lling expectation of a crisis in another region.
We also exclude the e®ect of international currency markets in the prop-
agation of ¯nancial crises from one country to another. Currency crises have
been extensively studied and Calvo (1995) and Chang and Velasco (1998),
among others, have studied the interaction of the banking system and cur-
rency markets in a crisis; but the role of currency markets in ¯nancial con-
tagion is left as a subject for future research. For a survey of recent work on
crises, see Calomiris (1995).
The central aim of this paper is to provide some microeoconomic founda-
tions for ¯nancial contagion. Although the analysis may have some relevance
to the recent Asian ¯nancial crisis, the model developed in this paper is not
intended to be a description of any particular episode. If it has a family
2resemblance to any historical episode, it would be to the banking crises in
the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Hicks
(1989)).
We take as our starting point the model presented in Allen and Gale
(1998a). The basic assumptions about technology and preferences have be-
come the standard in the literature since the appearance of the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) model. There are three dates t = 0;1;2 and a large number
of identical consumers, each of whom is endowed with one unit of a homoge-
neous consumption good. At date 1, the consumers learn whether they are
early consumers, who only value consumption at date 1, or late consumers,
who only value consumption at date 2. Uncertainty about their preferences
creates a demand for liquidity.
Banks have a comparative advantage in providing liquidity. At the ¯rst
date, consumers deposit their endowments in the banks, which invest them
on behalf of the depositors. In exchange, depositors are promised a ¯xed
amount of consumption at each subsequent date, depending on when they
choose to withdraw. The bank can invest in two assets. There is a short-term
asset that pays a return of one unit after one period and there is a long-term
asset that pays a return r < 1 after one period or R > 1 after two periods.
The long asset has a higher return if held to maturity, but liquidating it in the
middle period is costly, so it is not very useful for providing consumption to
early consumers. The banking sector is perfectly competitive, so banks o®er
risk-sharing contracts that maximize depositors' ex ante expected utility,
subject to a zero-pro¯t constraint.
Using this framework, we are interested in constructing a model in which
small shocks lead to large e®ects by means of contagion, more precisely, in
which a shock within a single sector can spread to other sectors and lead
to an economy-wide ¯nancial crisis. One view is that ¯nancial crises are
purely random events, unrelated to changes in the real economy (Kindle-
berger (1978)). The modern version of this view, developed by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and others, is that bank runs are self-ful¯lling prophecies. An
alternative view is that ¯nancial crises are an inherent part of the business
cycle (Mitchell (1941), Gorton (1988), Allen and Gale (1998a)). The disad-
vantage of treating contagion as a \sunspot" phenomenon is that, without
some real connection between di®erent regions, any pattern of correlations
is possible. So sunspot theories are equally consistent with contagion and
the absence of contagion. We are interested in establishing a stronger re-
3sult, that under certain circumstances any equilibrium of the model must be
characterized by contagion. This form of contagion must be driven by real
shocks and real linkages between regions.
The economy consists of a number of regions. The number of early and
late consumers in each region °uctuates randomly, but the aggregate demand
for liquidity is constant. This allows for inter-regional insurance as regions
with liquidity surpluses provide liquidity for regions with liquidity shortages.
One way to organize the provision of insurance is through an interbank mar-
ket in deposits. Suppose that region A has a large number of early consumers
when region B has a low number of early consumers, and vice versa. Since
regions A and B are otherwise identical, their deposits are perfect substi-
tutes. The banks exchange deposits at the ¯rst date before they observe
the liquidity shocks. If region A has a higher than average number of early
consumers at date 1 then banks in region A can meet their obligations by
liquidating some of their deposits in the banks of region B. Region B is
happy to oblige, because it has an excess supply of liquidity in the form of
the short asset. At the ¯nal date the process is reversed, as banks in region
B liquidate the deposits they hold in region A to meet the above-average
demand from late consumers in region B.
Inter-regional cross holdings of deposits work well as long as there is
enough liquidity in the banking system as a whole. If there is an excess
demand for liquidity, however, the ¯nancial linkages caused by these cross
holdings can turn out to be a disaster. While cross holdings of deposits
are useful for reallocating liquidity within the banking system, they cannot
increase the total amount of liquidity. If the economy-wide demand from
consumers is greater than the stock of the short asset, the only way to provide
more consumption is to liquidate the long asset. This is very costly, however,
so banks try to avoid doing this whenever possible (see Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) and Allen and Gale (1998a) for a discussion of the costs of premature
liquidation). As a result, banks in regions that are not immediately a®ected
by an excess demand for liquidity will avoid providing liquidity to regions
with an excess demand for liquidity. The result may be bank runs and
bankruptcy in the immediately a®ected region. What begins as a ¯nancial
crisis in one region can then spread by contagion to other regions because of
the cross-holdings of deposits.
Whether the ¯nancial crisis does spread in this way depends crucially on
the pattern of inter-connectedness generated by thecross holdings of deposits.
4If the interbank market is complete and each region is connected to all the
other regions, the initial impact of a ¯nancial crisis in one region may be
attenuated. On the other hand, if the interbank market is incomplete and,
as a result, each region is connected with a small number of other regions,
the initial impact of the ¯nancial crisis may be felt very strongly in those
neighboring regions, with the result that they too succumb to a crisis. As
each region is a®ected by the crisis, it prompts premature liquidation of long
assets, with a consequent loss of value, so that previously una®ected regions
¯nd that they too are a®ected because their claims on the region in crisis
have fallen in value.
It is important to note the role of the free rider problem in explaining
the di®erence between a complete and incomplete interbank market. There
is a natural pecking order among di®erent sources for liquidity. A bank
will meet withdrawals ¯rst from the short asset, then from deposits held in
other regions, and only in the last resort will it choose to liquidate the long
asset. Cross holdings of deposits are useful for redistributing liquidity, but
they do not create liquidity; so when there is a global shortage of liquidity
(withdrawals exceed short assets), the only solution is to liquidate long assets.
If every region takes a small hit (liquidates a small amount of the long asset)
there may be no need for a global crisis. This is what happens with complete
markets: banks in the troubled region have direct claims on banks in every
other region and there is no way to avoid paying one's share. With incomplete
markets, banks in the troubled region have a direct claim only on the banks
in adjacent regions. The banks in other regions maximize their own interests
and refuse to liquidate the long asset until they ¯nd themselves on the front
line of the contagion.
This paper is related to a diverse literature. The closest to our own
approach is the interesting paper by Laguno® and Schreft (1998), which
studies the spread of crises in a probabilistic model. Financial linkages are
modeled by assuming that each project requires two participants and each
participant requires two projects. When the probability that one's partner
will withdraw becomes too large, all participants simultaneously withdraw
and this is interpreted as a ¯nancial crisis. Financial multipliers are modeled
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1998). In their model, the impact of illiquidity
at one link in the credit chain travels down the chain. Edison, Pongsak
and Miller (1998) use the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model of credit cycles
as the basis for a model of ¯nancial crises: shortage of liquidity leads to
5collateral sales which put pressure on other ¯rms' ability to borrow. A similar
\meltdown" phenomenon in asset markets occurs in Allen and Gale (1998a).
Chan-Lau and Chen (1998) present a model of ¯nancial crises based on costly
monitoring. Models of crises based on multiple equilibria are Chari and
Kehoe (1997), Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Cooper and Corbae (1997). Fujiki,
Green and Yamazaki (1997) study settlement risk. Rochet and Tirole (1996)
use monitoring as a means of triggering correlated crises: if one bank fails, it
is assumed that other banks have not been properly monitored and a general
collapse occurs. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) have studied the e±ciency of
the provision of liquidity in a model where ¯rms have several methods of
providing future liquidity. In equilibrium, the provision of liquidity may be
ine±cient because of the use of non-contingent debt instruments.
The notion of contagion appears in game theory in a number of guises
(see Morris (1997) and Morris, Rob and Shin (1995)). The work of Ellison
(1993) emphasized the importance of local interactions for the di®usion of
cooperative behavior through a network. Chwe (1998) examines how the
structure of information networks in°uences the possibility of cooperation in
the context of a coordination problem. There is also a large literature on
local interactions in macroeconomics (e.g., Durlauf (1993), Scheinkman and
Woodford (1994)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
a model of liquidity preference based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and
Allen and Gale (1998a). In Section 3 we characterize optimal risk sharing in
terms of a planning problem subject to incentive constraints and show that
the incentive-e±cient allocation is in fact the same as the ¯rst best. Section
4 shows how the ¯rst-best allocation can be decentralized through a compet-
itive banking system with an interbank market in deposits. Several di®erent
market structures are described and each turns out to be consistent with the
¯rst best. The robustness of this schema is tested in the next three sections.
We do this by perturbing the model to allow for an (aggregate) excess de-
mand for liquidity in some states of nature. In Section 5 it is shown that with
an incomplete interbank market and a high degree of interconnectedness, a
liquidity shock that causes a crisis in one region will spread by contagion to
others. In Section 6, we consider a complete interbank market and an even
higher degree of connectedness. It is shown that, with the same size shock
and the same model parameters, there is no contagion. In Section 7, it is
shown that with an incomplete interbank market and a low degree of con-
6nectedness, there is again no contagion. So the interaction of connectedness
and incompleteness appear to be conducive to contagion.
2 Liquidity Preference
In this section we describe a simple model in which stochastic liquidity prefer-
ence provides a motive for risk-sharing. The framework is based on Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (1998a), with some signi¯cant di®er-
ences.
There are three dates t = 0;1;2. There is a single consumption good
which serves as the numeraire. This good can also be invested in assets to
produce future consumption. There are two types of assets, a liquid asset and
an illiquid asset. The liquid asset is represented by a storage technology. One
unit of the consumption good invested in the storage technology at date t
produces one unit of the consumption good at date t+1. Because the returns
to this asset are available one period later, we refer to it as the short asset.
The illiquid asset has a higher return but requires more time to mature. For
this reason we call it the long asset. Investment in the long asset can only
take place in the ¯rst period and one unit of the consumption good invested
in the long asset at the ¯rst date produces R > 1 units of output at the ¯nal
date.
The long asset is not completely illiquid. Each unit of the long asset can
be prematurely liquidated to produce 0 < r < 1 units of the consumption
good at the middle date. Here we assume that liquidation takes the form of
physical depreciation of the asset and the liquidation value is treated as a
technological constant, the \scrap value". In practice, it is more likely that
assets are liquidated by being sold, in which case the liquidation value is
determined by the market price. Introducing a secondary market on which
assets can be sold would complicate the analysis without changing the qual-
itative features of the model. Allen and Gale (1998a) incorporates an asset
market and endogenizes the liquidation values of assets. The analysis in
Allen and Gale (1998a) con¯rms that the liquidation value will be low for
appropriate parameter values.
The economy is divided into four ex ante identical regions, labeled A;B;C;
and D. The regional structure is a spatial metaphor that can be interpreted
in a variety of ways. The important thing for the analysis is that di®erent
7regions receive di®erent liquidity shocks. Any story that motivates di®erent
shocks for di®erent (groups of) banks is a possible interpretation of the re-
gional structure. So a region can correspond to a single bank, a geographical
region within a country, or an entire country; it can also correspond to a
specialized sector within the banking industry.
Each region contains a continuum of ex ante identical consumers (depos-
itors). A consumer has an endowment equal to one unit of the consumption
good at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2. Consumers are assumed to have
the usual Diamond-Dybvig preferences: with probability ! they are early
consumers and only value consumption at date 1; with probability (1 ¡ !)
they are late consumers and only value consumption at date 2. Then the
preferences of the individual consumer are given by
U(c1;c2) =
(
u(c1) with probability !
u(c2) with probability 1 ¡ !
where ct denotes consumption at date t = 1;2. The period utility func-
tions u(¢) are assumed to be twice continuously di®erentiable, increasing and
strictly concave.
The probability ! varies fromregion to region. Let !i denote the probabil-
ity of being an early consumer in region i. There are two possible values of !i,
a high value and a low value, denoted !H and !L, where 0 < !L < !H < 1.
The realization of these random variables depends on the state of nature.
There are two equally likely states S1 and S2 and the corresponding realiza-
tions of the liquidity preference shocks are given in the table below:
Table 1: Regional Liquidity Shocks
A B C D
S1 !H !L !H !L
S2 !L !H !L !H
Note that ex ante each region has the same probability of having a high
liquidity preference shock. Also, the aggregate demand for liquidity is the
same in each state: half the regions have high liquidity preference and half
have low liquidity preference.
8All uncertainty is resolved at date 1 when the state of nature S1 or S2 is
revealed and each consumer learns whether he is an early or late consumer.
A consumer's type is not observable, so late consumers can always imitate
early consumers.
Before introducing the banking sector into our story, it will be convenient
to characterize the optimal allocation of risk.
3 Optimal Risk-Sharing
In this section we characterize optimal risk sharing as the solution to a plan-
ning problem. Since consumers are ex ante identical, it is natural to treat
consumers symmetrically. For this reason, the planner is assumed to make
all the investment and consumption decisions to maximize the unweighted
sum of consumers' expected utility.
We begin by describing the planner's problem under the assumption that
the planner can identify early and late consumers. The symmetry and con-
cavity of the objective function and the convexity of the constraints simpli¯es
the problem considerably.
² Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the optimal consumption allo-
cation will be independent of the state.
² Since the consumers in one region are ex ante identical to consumers
in another region, all consumers will be treated alike.
Without loss of generality, then, we can assume that every early consumer
receives consumption c1 and every late consumer receives c2, independently
of the region and state of nature. At the ¯rst date, the planner chooses a
portfolio (x;y) ¸ 0 subject to the feasibility constraint
x + y · 1; (1)
where x and y are the per capita amounts invested in the long and short
assets respectively.
² Since the total amount of consumption provided in each period is a
constant, it is optimal to provide for consumption at date 1 by holding
the short asset and to provide for consumption at date 2 by holding
the long asset.
9Let the average fraction of early consumers be denoted by ° = (!H +!L)=2.
Then the feasibility constraint at date 1 is
°c1 · y (2)
and the feasibility constraint at date 2 is
(1 ¡ °)c2 · Rx: (3)
At date 0 each consumer has an equal probability of being an early or a late







and this is what the planner seeks to maximize, subject to the constraints
(1), (2) and (3). The unique solution to this unconstrained problem is called
the ¯rst-best allocation.




Otherwise, the objective function could be increased by using the short asset
to shift some consumption from early to late consumers. Thus, the ¯rst-best
allocation automatically satis¯es the incentive constraint
c1 · c2; (5)
which says that late consumers ¯nd it weakly optimal to reveal their true
type, rather than pretend to be early consumers. The incentive-e±cient
allocation maximizes the objective function (4) subject to the feasibility con-
straints (1), (2), and (3), and the incentive-constraint (5). What we have
shown is that the incentive-e±cient allocation is the same as the ¯rst-best
allocation.
Proposition 1 The ¯rst-best allocation (x;y;c1;c2) is equivalent to the incentive-
e±cient allocation, so the ¯rst best can be achieved even if the planner cannot
observe the consumers' types.
10In order to achieve the ¯rst best, the planner has to transfer resources among
the di®erent regions. In state S1, for example, there are !H early consumers
in regions A and C and !L early consumers in regions B and D. Each region
has °c1 units of the short asset, which provide °c1 units of consumption.
So regions A and C each have an excess demand for (!H ¡ °)c1 units of
consumption and regions B and D each have an excess supply of (°¡!L)c1 =
(!H ¡ °)c2 units of consumption. By re-allocating this consumption, the
planner can satisfy every region's needs. At date 2, the transfers °ow in
the opposite direction, because regions B and D have an excess demand of
(!H¡°)c2 units each and regions A and C have an excess supply of (!h¡°)c2
units each.
4 Decentralization
In this section we describe how the ¯rst-best allocation can be decentralized
by a competitive banking sector. There are two reasons for focusing on the
¯rst best. One is technical: it turns out that it is much easier to characterize
the equilibrium conditions when the allocation is the ¯rst best. The second
reason is that, as usual, we are interested in knowing under what conditions
the market \works". For the moment, we are only concerned with the feasi-
bility of decentralization. The optimality of the banks' behavior is discussed
in Section 8.1.
The role of banks is to make investments on behalf of consumers and to
insure them against liquidity shocks. We assume that only banks invest in
the long asset. This gives the bank two advantages over consumers. First, the
banks can hold a portfolio consisting of both types of assets, which will typi-
cally be preferred to a portfolio consisting of the short asset alone. Secondly,
by pooling the assets of a large number of consumers, the bank can o®er
insurance to consumers against their uncertain liquidity demands, giving the
early consumers some of the bene¯ts of the high-yielding long asset without
subjecting them to the high costs of liquidating the long asset prematurely
at the second date.
In each region there is a continuum of identical banks. We focus on a
symmetric equilibrium in which all banks adopt the same behavior. Thus,
we can describe the decentralized allocation in terms of the behavior of a
representative bank in each region.
11Without loss of generality, we can assume that each consumer deposits
his endowment of one unit of the consumption good in the representative
bank in his region. The bank invests the deposit in a portfolio (xi;yi) ¸ 0
and, in exchange, o®ers a deposit contract (ci
1;ci
2) that allows the depositor to
withdraw either ci
1 units of consumption at date 1 or ci
2 units of consumption
at date 2. Note that the deposit contract is not contingent on the liquidity
shock in region i. In order to achieve the ¯rst best through a decentralized
banking sector, we need to put (xi;yi) = (x;y) and (ci
1;ci
2) = (c1;c2), where
(x;y;c1;c2) is the ¯rst-best allocation.
The problem with this approach is that, while the investment portfolio
satis¯es the bank's budget constraint x + y · 1 at the ¯rst date, it will not
satisfy the budget constraint at the second date. The planner can move con-
sumption between regions, so he only needs to satisfy the average constraint
°c1 · y. The representative bank, on the other hand, has to face the possi-
bility that the fraction of early consumers in its region may be above average,
!H > °, in which case it will need more than y to satisfy the demands of
the early consumers. It can meet this excess demand by liquidating some of
the long asset, but then it will not have enough consumption to meet the
demands of the late consumers at date 2. In fact, if r is small enough, the
bank may not be able to pay the late consumers even c1. Then the late
consumers will prefer to withdraw at date 1 and store the consumption good
until date 2, thus causing a bank run.
There is no overall shortage of liquidity, it is just badly distributed. One
way to allow the banks to overcome the maldistribution of the liquidity is by
introducing an interbank market in deposits.
4.1 The Interbank Deposit Market
Suppose that banks are allowed to exchange deposits at the ¯rst date. This
case of complete markets is illustrated in Figure 1. Each region is negatively
correlated with two other regions. We therefore assume that every bank in
region i holds zi = (!H ¡ °)=2 > 0 deposits in each of the regions j 6= i.
Since bank deposits are identical and worth one unit each at the ¯rst date,
the representative bank's budget constraint will still be satis¯ed at date 0.
At the beginning of the second period the state of nature S is observed and
the banks have to adjust their portfolios to satisfy their budget constraints.
If the region has a high demand for liquidity, !i = !H, it liquidates all of
12its deposits in other regions. On the other hand, if it has a low demand for
liquidity, !i = !L, it retains the deposits it holds in the other regions until
the ¯nal date.
Consider the budget constraint of a bank in a region with a high demand
for liquidity. It must pay c1 to the fraction !H of early consumers in its
own region and also redeem the zj = (!H ¡ °)=2 deposits of the other high-
demand region. So the total demand for repayment is [!H + (!H ¡ °)=2]c1.
On the other side of the ledger, it has y units of the short asset and claims
to 3zi = 3(!H ¡ °)=2 deposits in the other three regions. Thus, the budget
constraint that must be satis¯ed is
[!H + (!H ¡ °)=2]c1 = y + 3(!H ¡ °)=2
which simpli¯es to the planner's constraint
°c1 = y:
Regions with low liquidity demand must pay c1 to a fraction !L of their own
depositors and redeem 2zi = (!H ¡°) deposits from the banks in the regions
with high liquidity demand. It has y units of the short asset to meet these
demands, so the budget constraint that must be satis¯ed is
[!L + (!H ¡°)]c1 = y:
Since !H ¡ ° = ° ¡ !L, this equation simpli¯es to the planner's constraint
°c1 = y. In both cases, the cross holdings of deposits allow the banks to
meet the demands of their depositors without liquidating the long asset.
At the last date, all the banks liquidate their remaining assets and it is
easy to show that if the budget constraints at the second date are satis¯ed,
the budget constraints at the third date are automatically satis¯ed too. For
example, the budget constraint at date 2 for a region that had high liquidity
preference at date 1 will be
[(1 ¡ !H) + (!H ¡ °)]c2 = Rx
where the left hand side is the demand for withdrawals, comprising the de-
mand of the late consumers in the region 1¡!H, plus the demand from the
two regions with low liquidity preference 2zj = (!H ¡°). On the right hand
side, we have the liquidation value of the long asset Rx. This simpli¯es to
13the planner's constraint (1 ¡ °)c2 = Rx. The same is true of the budget
constraint for the regions with a low liquidity shock:
[(1 ¡ !L) + (!H ¡°)=2]c2 · Rx + 3[(!H ¡ °)=2]c2:
Thus, by shu²ing deposits among the di®erent regions, it is possible for
banks to satisfy their budget constraints in each state S and at each date
t = 0;1;2 while providing their depositors with the ¯rst-best consumption
allocation through a standard deposit contract.
4.2 Incompleteness in the Interbank Deposit Market
The interbank market in the preceding section is complete in the sense that
a bank in region i can hold deposits in every other region j 6= i. In some
cases, this may not be realistic. The banking sector is interconnected in a
variety of ways, but transaction and information costs may prevent banks
from acquiring claims on banks in remote regions. To the extent that banks
specialize in particular areas of business or have closer connections with banks
that operate in the same geographical or political unit, deposits may tend
to be concentrated in \neighboring" banks. To capture this e®ect, which
is crucial in the sequel, we introduce the notion of incompleteness in the
interbank market by assuming that banks in region i are allowed to hold
deposits in some but not all of the other regions. For concreteness we assume
that banks in each region hold deposits only in one adjacent region, as shown
in Figure 2. It can be seen that banks in region A can hold deposits in region
B, banks in region B can hold deposits in region C and so on.
As before we suppose the representative bank in region i holds an invest-
ment portfolio (xi;yi) = (x;y) and o®ers a deposit contract (ci
1;ci
2) = (c1;c2).
We also assume that the bank holds zi = (!H ¡ °) deposits in the adjacent
region at the ¯rst date, that is, the bank in region A holds (!H ¡°) deposits
in region B, and so on. The ¯rst-period budget constraint is satis¯ed as be-
fore, because the exchanges of deposits, having the same values, cancel out,
leaving the budget constraint x + y · 1.
At date 1 the aggregate state is observed and banks and consumers learn
the liquidity shock in each region. As before, we only need to distinguish
regions according to whether they have high or low demands for liquidity.
Regions with the high liquidity shock !H liquidate their deposits in other
14banks at the second date while banks with the low liquidity shock !L, do
not. The market structure that is assumed here has the property that every
region with a high liquidity shock has deposits in a region with a low liquidity
shock, and vice versa. The budget constraint of a high liquidity shock region
is
!Hc1 = y + (!H ¡°)c1
and the budget constraint of a low liquidity shock region is
[!L + (!H ¡°)]c1 = y:
Substituting !H ¡ ° = ° ¡ !L and simplifying, it is seen that both con-
straints are equivalent to the planner's constraint °c1 = y. Likewise, at the
¯nal date the budget constraint for the high and low liquidity shock regions,
respectively, are
[(1 ¡ !H) + (!H ¡ °)]c2 = Rx
and
(1 ¡ !L)c2 = Rx + (!H ¡ °)c2
and both are equivalent to the planner's constraint (1 ¡ °)c2 = Rx.
So even if the interbank deposit market is incomplete, it is possible to
satisfy the budget constraints by shu²ing deposits through the interbank
market. However, although it is possible to achieve the ¯rst best with ei-
ther complete or incomplete markets, we shall see that the implications for
¯nancial fragility are very di®erent in the two cases.
One interesting feature of the market structure in Figure 2 is that, al-
though each region is relying on just its neighbor for liquidity, the entire
economy is connected. Region A holds deposits in region B, which holds
deposits in region C, and so on. In fact, this is unavoidable given the mar-
ket structure assumed. Consider the alternative market structure shown in
Figure 3. Region A holds deposits in region B and region B holds deposits
in region A. Likewise, region C holds one unit of deposits in region D and
region D holds one unit of deposits in region C. This market structure is
more incomplete than the one in Figure 2 and the pattern of holdings in
Figure 2 is incompatible with it. However, it is possible to achieve the ¯rst
best through the pattern of holdings in Figure 3. This is true even though
the economy is disconnected, since regions A and B trade with each other
but not with regions C and D and regions C and D trade with each other
15but not with regions A and B. Again, these patterns do not seem to have
any signi¯cance as far as achieving the ¯rst best is concerned; but they turn
out to have striking di®erences for ¯nancial fragility.
5 Fragility
To illustrate the ¯nancial fragility of the optimal risk sharing allocation, we
use the decentralization results from Section 4. Then we perturb the model
to allow for the occurrence of a state ¹ S in which the aggregate demand for
liquidity is greater than the system's ability to supply liquidity and show
that this can lead to an economy-wide crisis.
The market structure is assumed to begiven by Figure 2. The correspond-
ing allocation requires each bank to hold an initial portfolio of investments
(x;y) and o®er a deposit contract (c1;c2), where (x;y;c1;c2) is the ¯rst-best
allocation. In order to make this deposit contract feasible, the representa-
tive bank in each region holds z = (!H ¡°) deposits in the adjacent region.
Note that z is the minimal amount that is needed to satisfy the budget con-
straints. It will become apparent that larger cross-holdings of deposits, while
consistent with the ¯rst best in Section 4, would make the contagion problem
worse.
Now, let us take the allocation as given and consider what happens when
we \perturb" the model. By a perturbation we mean the realization of a
state ¹ S that was assigned zero probability at date 0 and has a demand for
liquidity that is very close to that of the states that do occur with positive
probability. Speci¯cally, the liquidity shocks are
Table 2: Regional Liquidity Shocks with Perturbation
A B C D
S1 !H !L !H !L
S2 !L !H !L !H
¹ S ° + " ° ° °
:
In state ¹ S, every region has the previous average demand for liquidity °
except for region A where the demand for liquidity is somewhat higher °+".
The important fact is that the average demand for liquidity across all four
regions is slightly higher than in the normal states S1 and S2. Since the
16abnormal state ¹ S occurs with negligible probability (in the limit, probability
zero) it will not change the allocation at date 0. In states S1 and S2 the
continuation equilibrium will be the same as before at date 1; in state ¹ S the
continuation equilibrium will be di®erent.
In the continuation equilibrium beginning at date 1, consumers will op-
timally decide whether to withdraw their deposits at date 1 or date 2 and
banks will liquidate their assets in an attempt to meet the demands of their
depositors. Early consumers always withdraw at date 1; late consumers will
withdraw at date 1 or date 2 depending on which gives them the larger
amount of consumption. Because we want to focus on essential bank crises,
we assume that late consumers will always withdraw their deposits at date
2 if it is (weakly) optimal for them to do so. Banks are required to meet
their promise to pay c1 units of consumption to each depositor who demands
withdrawal at date 1. If they cannot do so, they must liquidate all of their
assets at date 1. As in Allen and Gale (1998a) the proceeds of the liquidation
are split pro rata among depositors (i.e., we do not assume ¯rst come ¯rst
served). If the bank can meets its obligations at date 1, then the remaining
assets are liquidated at date 2 and given to the depositors who have waited
until date 2 to withdraw. In the rest of this section, we describe the continu-
ation equilibrium at date 1 in state ¹ S, assuming the actions consistent with
the ¯rst best at date 0.
5.1 The Liquidation \Pecking Order"
At date 1 a bank can ¯nd itself in one of three conditions. A bank is said
to be solvent, if it can meet the demands of every depositor who wants to
withdraw (including banks in other regions) by using only its liquid assets,
that is, the short asset and the deposits in other regions. The bank is said to
be insolvent if it can meet the demands of its deposits but only by liquidating
some of the long asset. Finally, the bank is said to be bankrupt if it cannot
meet the demands of its depositors by liquidating all its assets.
These de¯nitions are motivated by the assumption that banks will always
¯nd it preferable to liquidate assets in a particular order at date 1. We call
this the \pecking order" for liquidating assets and it goes as follows: ¯rst,
the bank liquidates the short asset, then it liquidates deposits, and ¯nally it
liquidates the long asset. To ensure that the long asset is liquidated last, we







which is maintained in the sequel. Since the ¯rst-best consumption allocation
(c1;c2) is independent of r (this variable does not appear in the ¯rst-best
problem in Section 3) we can always ensure that condition (6) is satis¯ed by
choosing r su±ciently small.
Each of the three assets o®ers a di®erent cost of obtaining current (date
1) consumption in terms of future (date 2) consumption. The cheapest is
the short asset. One unit of the short asset is worth one unit of consumption
today and, if reinvested in the short asset, this is worth one unit of consump-
tion tomorrow. So the cost of obtaining liquidity by liquidating the short
asset is 1. Similarly, by liquidating one unit of deposits, the bank gives up
c2 units of future consumption and obtains c1 units of present consumption.
So the cost of obtaining liquidity by liquidating deposits is c2=c1. From the
¯rst-order condition u0(c1) = Ru0(c2) we know that c2=c1 > 1. Finally, by
liquidating one unit of the long asset, the bank gives up R units of future
consumption and obtains r units of present consumption. So the cost of ob-
taining liquidity by liquidating the long asset is R=r. Thus, we have derived








In order to maximize the interests of depositors, the bank must liquidate the
short asset before it liquidates deposits in other regions before it liquidates
the long asset.
The preceding argument assumes that the banks in other regions are not
bankrupt. The bankruptcy rules require all assets to be liquidated immedi-
ately, so all deposit holders in a bankrupt institution will want to liquidate
their deposits immediately regardless of their own condition.
5.2 Liquidation Values
The value of a deposit at date 1 is c1 if the bank is not bankrupt and it is
equal to the liquidation value of all the bank's assets if the bank is bankrupt.
18Let qi denote the value of the representative bank's deposits in region i at
date 1. If qi < c1 then all the depositors will withdraw as much as they
can at date 1. In particular, the banks in other regions will be seeking to
withdraw their claims on the bank at the same time that the bank is trying
to redeem its claims on them. All depositors must be treated equally, that is,
every depositor gets qi from the bank for each unit invested at the ¯rst date,
whether the depositor is a consumer or a bank from another region. Then the
values of qi must be determined simultaneously. Consider the representative
bank in region A, for example. If all the depositors withdraw, the total
demands will be 1 + z, since the banks in region D hold z deposits and the
consumers in region A hold 1 deposit. The liabilities of the bank are valued
at (1 + z)qA. The assets consist of y units of the short asset, x units of the
long asset, and z deposits in region B. The assets are valued at y+rx+zqB.
The equilibrium values of qA must equate the value of assets and liabilities
q
A =
y + rx + zqB
(1 + z)
: (7)
A similar equation must hold for any region i in which qi < c1.
If qB = c1 then we can use this equation to calculate the value of qA; but
if qB < c1 then we need another equation to determine qB and this equation
will include the value of qC, and so on.
5.3 Bu®ers and Bank Runs
Suppose that a bank is insolvent and has to liquidate some of the long asset.
For the moment, we assume that the late consumers wait until the last date
and we ignore the role of banks in other regions. How much can the bank
a®ord to give the consumers at the ¯rst date? The bank must give the
late consumers at least c1 at date 2, otherwise they would be better o®
withdrawing at date 1. So a bank with a fraction ! of early consumers must
keep at least (1¡!)c1=R units of the long asset to satisfy the late consumers
at date 2. Then the amount of the long asset that can be liquidated at date
1 is (x¡(1¡!)c1=R) and the amount of consumption that can be obtained
by liquidating the long asset without causing a run is
b(!) ´ r(x ¡ (1 ¡!)c1=R):
19We call b(!) the bank's bu®er.
In region A, the bank has y = °c1 units of the short asset. The fraction
of early consumers is °+" in state ¹ S, so in order to pay each early consumer
c1 units of consumption, the bank will have to get "c1 units consumption by
liquidating the long asset. This is feasible, without any help from the banks
in other regions, if and only if the increased demand for liquidity "c1 is less
than the bu®er:
"c1 · b(° + "): (8)
In most of what follows, we assume that condition (8) is violated. In other
words, if region A had to remain self su±cient, it would be bankrupt, because
there is no way it can feasibly o®er its late consumers c1 at date 2 (to prevent
a run) and meet the demands of its early consumers for c1 at date 1.
When " > 0 is small enough to satisfy the inequality (8), the banks in
region A are insolvent, but there are no repercussions for the banks in other
regions. The late consumers in region A are worse o®, because the premature
liquidation of the long asset at date 1 prevents the bank from paying c2 to
depositors at date 2. (The pecking order implies that the banks in regions B,
C, and D will liquidate their deposits in regions C, D, and A, respectively,
rather than liquidate the long asset).
When " is large enough to violate condition (8), banks in region A will
be bankrupt. Although they have deposits in region B, these deposits are of
no use as long as the value of deposits in region A is qA = c1. Other regions
will liquidate their deposits in order to avoid liquidating the long asset. As
long as all the deposits have the same value, the mutual withdrawals simply
cancel out. Once the banks in region A are bankrupt, there will be a spillover
e®ect to region D. A deposit in region D is worth qD = c1 and a deposit
in region A is worth qA < c1, so banks in region D su®er a loss when cross
holdings of deposits are liquidated. If " is not too large, this spillover e®ect
will make region D banks insolvent, but will not force them into bankruptcy.
If " is larger still, so that the spillover e®ect exceeds region D's bu®er,
then region D banks will be bankrupt too. The liquidation of region D's
long assets will cause a loss to banks in region C and this time the spillover
e®ect is large enough that region C too will be bankrupt. As we go from
region to region the spillover gets larger and larger, because more regions are
in bankruptcy and more losses have accumulated from liquidating the long
asset. So once region D goes bankrupt, all the regions go bankrupt. This
20result is summarized in the following proposition.
As this informal discussion suggests, two conditions must be satis¯ed in
order for the initial shock to region A to spread to all the other regions. First,
the liquidity preference shock in region A must exceed the bu®er in region
A:
"c1 > b(° + "): (9)
Second, the spillover e®ect to region D must exceed the bu®er in region D.
A lower bound for the spillover e®ect is z(c1 ¡ ¹ qA), where z is the amount
of deposits held and ¹ qA is an upper bound on the value of the deposits in
region A under bankruptcy. To derive the upper bound ¹ qA we use equation
(7) and assume that qB = c1:
q
A · ¹ q
A =
y + rx + zc1
(1 + z)
: (10)
Then a su±cient condition for the spillover to exceed the bu®er in region D
is
z(c1 ¡ ¹ q
A) > b(°): (11)
The term zc1 is the amount promised to the banks in Region C and z¹ qA is the
upper bound on the value of deposits in Region A. Hence the left hand side
of the condition is the di®erence between liabilities and the upper bound on
assets in the interbank deposit market for Region D. If this exceeds Region
D's bu®er the spillover will force region D banks into bankruptcy.
Proposition 2 Consider the model with market structure described in Fig-
ure 2 and perturb it by the addition of the zero probability state ¹ S. Suppose
that each bank chooses an investment portfolio (x;y;z) and o®ers a deposit
contract (c1;c2), where (x;y) is the ¯rst-best investment portfolio, (c1;c2) is
the ¯rst-best consumption allocation, and z = (!H ¡°). Suppose that condi-
tions (9) and (11) are satis¯ed. Then, in any continuation equilibrium, the
banks in all regions must go bankrupt at date 1 in state ¹ S.
Proof. The proof requires several steps.
Step 1. We ¯rst suppose that there is a continuation equilibrium in which
qi = c1 in every region i and show that this leads to a contradiction. The
demand for deposits from early consumers is °+" in region A and ° in regions
21B;C and D. The stock of the short asset is y = °c1, so there is an aggregate
excess demand for liquidity that can only be met by liquidating the long
asset in some region. To avoid liquidating the long asset, banks must redeem
at least as many deposits as are withdrawn by banks from other regions.
Since no bank wants to liquidate the long asset if it can be avoided, the only
equilibrium is one in which all banks simultaneously withdraw their deposits
in banks in other regions at date 1. These mutual withdrawals o®set each
other so each region is forced to be self-su±cient, that is, no region is able
to get extra liquidity from the other regions.
We have already seen that self-su±ciency implies the banks in region A
are bankrupt. Thus, we have a contradiction that implies that the banks
in some region must be bankrupt. In fact, the banks in region A must be
bankrupt. By the earlier argument, qi < c1 for some i implies that all banks
will withdraw their deposits in other regions. Then either qB = c1 and
region A receives no net in°ows from the interbank market or qB < c1 and
the situation is even worse because Region A loses money on its deposits in
region B. In either case, qA = c1 is impossible because of condition (9).
Step 2. Having established that banks in region A must be bankrupt, we
next show that the ¯nancial crisis must extend to other regions. Consider
region D ¯rst. For the reasons explained above, all banks will be liquidating
their deposits in other regions in any continuation equilibrium in state ¹ S.
An upper bound on the liquidation value qA of the deposits in region A is
obtained by assuming that qB = c1, that is qA · ¹ qA. If banks in region D are
not bankrupt, the liabilities of the banks in region D are (°+z)c1, because a
fraction ° of consumers withdraw early and the banks in region C withdraw
z deposits and each deposit is worth c1. The liquid assets of the bank are
worth y + zqA and the bu®er b(°) is the most that can be obtained from
liquidating the long asset without violating the incentive constraint. So, to
avoid bankruptcy, it must be the case that
(° + z)c1 · y + b(°) + zq
A
· y + b(°) + z¹ q
A:
Since °c1 = y, this inequality implies that z(c1 ¡ ¹ qA) · b(°), contradicting
condition (11). Thus, the banks in region D must be bankrupt also.
Step 3. The argument from Step 2 can be continued by induction. In fact,
since we know that ¹ qA < c1, we must have qD < ¹ qA. Then it is easier
22to violate the non-bankruptcy condition in region C than it was in region
D and this shows that qC < qA. Then using the same argument, we have
qi < ¹ qA for every region i. All regions are in bankruptcy and the only possible
continuation equilibrium is one in which
q
i = y + rx < c1
for i = A;B;C;D.
6 Robustness
The incompleteness of markets is essential to the contagion result in the
following sense. There exist parameter values for which any equilibrium
with incomplete markets involves runs in state ¹ S (this is the set of parameter
values characterized in Section 5). For the same parameter values, we can
¯nd an equilibrium with complete markets that does not involve runs in state
¹ S.
To see this, we go back to the complete markets equilibrium in Section 4.
The values of the investment portfolio (x;y) and the deposit contract (c1;c2)
are the same; but to make the ¯rst-best allocation feasible at dates 1 and
2, the representative bank holds z=2 = (!H ¡ °)=2 deposits in each of the
other regions. The claim on any one region is smaller than in the equilibrium
in Section 5, but the total claim 3z=2 is larger. Again, z=2 is the smallest
amount of deposits consistent with feasibility.
Consider now what happens in a continuation equilibrium at date 1 when
state ¹ S occurs, assuming that the actions at date 0 have not changed. We as-
sume, of course, that the conditions of Proposition 2 continue to hold. Using
exactly the same argument as before, we can show that banks in region A are
bankrupt: there is an aggregate excess demand for liquidity, the other regions
will not provide liquidity, and because condition (8) is violated the banks in
region A cannot meet their depositors' demands. The question is whether
this requires that the other regions should also experience bankruptcy.
To address this question, we have to calculate the liquidation value of the
deposits in region A. Assuming that none of the other regions is bankrupt,
we observe that the assets are valued at y + rx+ 3(z=2)c1 and the liabilities
23are valued at (1 + 3z=2)qA, so
q
A¤ =
y + rx + 3(z=2)c1
(1 + 3z=2)
: (12)
The loss to each bank in regions j 6= A because of the collapse of banks in
region A is (z=2)(c1 ¡ qA¤) and since the bank's holding of the short asset y
is just enough to satisfy its own early consumers, the bank will be insolvent,
but not bankrupt, if and only if this amount is less than or equal to the
bu®er:
(z=2)(c1 ¡ q
A¤) · b(°): (13)
This condition (13) can be satis¯ed even though conditions (8) and (11) are
violated because the ¯nancial interdependence, measured by z=2, is smaller.
7 Containment
The critical ingredient in the example of contagion analyzed in Section 5 is
that any two regions are connected by a chain of overlapping bank liabilities.
Banks in region A have claims on banks in region B, which in turn have
claims on banks in regions C, and so on. If we could cut this chain at some
point, the contagion that begins with a small shock in region A would be
contained in subset of the set of regions.
Consider the incomplete market structure in Figure 3 and the allocation
that implements the ¯rst best, which was described in Section 4. The allo-
cation requires banks in regions A and B to have claims on each other and
banks in regions C and D to have claims on each other, but there is no con-
nection between the region fA;Bg and the region fC;Dg. If state ¹ S occurs,
the excess demand for liquidity will cause bankruptcies in region A and they
may under certain conditions spread to region B, but there is no reason why
they should spread any further. Banks in regions C and D are simply not
connected to the troubled banks in regions A and B.
Comparing the three market structures we have considered so far, com-
plete markets in Figure 1, incomplete markets in Figure 2, and the discon-
nected market structure in Figure 3, we can see that there is a non-monotonic
relationship between completeness or incompleteness of markets and the ex-
tent of the ¯nancial crisis in state ¹ S. With the complete markets structure
24of Figure 1 the crisis is restricted to region A, with the market structure in
Figure 2 the crisis extends to all regions, and with the market structure in
Figure 3 the crisis is restricted to regions A and B.
It could be argued that the market structures are not monotonically or-
dered: the complete markets network does contain the other two, but the
paths in the network in Figure 3 are not a subset of the network in Figure 2.
This could be changed by adding paths to Figure 2, but then the equilibrium
of Figure 3 would also be an equilibrium of Figure 2. This raises an obvious
but important point, that contagion depends on the endogenous pattern of
¯nancial claims. An incomplete market structure like the one in Figure 2
may preclude a complete pattern of ¯nancial connectedness and thus encour-
age ¯nancial contagion; but a complete market structure does not imply the
opposite: even with complete markets there may be an endogenous choice of
overlapping claims that causes contagion. In fact, the three equilibria consid-
ered so far are all consistent with the complete market structure. There are
additional equilibria for the economy with the complete market structure.
Like the three considered so far, they achieve the ¯rst best in states S1 and
S2, but have di®erent degrees of ¯nancial fragility in the unexpected state ¹ S,
depending on the patterns of interregional deposit holding.
What is important about the market structure in Figure 2, then, is that
the pattern of interregional cross holdings of deposits that promotes the
possibility of contagion is the only one consistent with this market structure.
Since we are interested in contagion as an essential phenomenon, this market
structure has a special role. The complete markets economy, by contrast,




In the preceding sections we have discussed the continuation equilibrium at
dates 1 and 2, but not said anything about the equilibrium behavior at date
0. It is clear that it is optimal for consumers at date 0 to deposit their
endowment with the banks, because they could not achieve the same level
of expected utility in autarky, even if they were able to invest in both the
25short and the long assets. What is less obvious is whether the behavior of
the banks is optimal in some sense.
The bank has to choose an investment portfolio, a deposit contract, and
a position in the interbank deposit market to maximize the consumers' ex-
pected utility at date 0. The tricky part is choosing how much to trade on
the interbank market. In order to ¯nance deposits in other regions, it will
have to sell its own deposits to other banks. But the value of its deposits will
depend on the choice of the investment portfolio and the deposit contract and
the withdrawal decisions made by depositors at the second and third dates.
We can ¯nesse the complex calculation of the bank's optimal behavior by
noting that since all trade is voluntary, anything the bank does to make its
own consumers better o® cannot make anyone else worse o® (since a single
bank is negligible, the rest of the economy gets zero surplus from trading
with it). Then the fact that the allocation at the second and third dates is
(¯rst-best) optimal implies that there is no deviation that the bank would
prefer.
The achievement of the ¯rst best depends on the assumption of no ag-
gregate uncertainty. In general, when there is aggregate uncertainty, the
¯rst-best is not attainable and the characterization of the equilibrium ac-
tions at date 0 (and subsequent dates) will be much more di±cult. This is
an important topic for future research, but it lies outside the scope of this
paper.
8.2 Many States and Regions
The arguments developed in this paper extend easily to the case of many
regions and many states of nature. Suppose that there are n regions and
suppose that the liquidity shocks !i are ¯nite-valued and exchangeable. If
the economy-wide fraction of early consumers is a constant, then the ¯rst best
allocation (x;y;c1;c2) is non-stochastic and independent of the consumer's
region.
A market structure is characterized by a family of neighborhoods: for
each region i the neighborhood Ni is the set of regions in which a bank
in region i can hold deposits. The market structure is connected if for any
regions i and j there is a ¯nite chain of regions, beginning with i and ending
with j such that for each adjacent pair, banks in the ¯rst region can hold
deposits in the second. As long as the market structure is connected the ¯rst
26best can be decentralized by a competitive banking sector using standard
deposit contracts.
A market structure is complete if banks in region i can hold deposits in
every other region j 6= i; otherwise it is incomplete. The degree of complete-
ness and connectedness is crucial for determining the necessity of contagion.
With complete markets and a given set of parameters, increasing the num-
ber of regions eventually eliminates the necessity of contagion, because the
initial impact of a liquidity shortage in a single region becomes negligible as
the number of regions becomes unboundedly large.
In the example of Section 5, a liquidity shortage in one region can lead
to crises in all four regions. The same argument works with any number
of regions. In fact, as contagion \spreads" from one region to another, the
spillovers become larger and it is easier to keep the contagion going. In the
general case, contagion can spread from a single region to an arbitrarily large
number n of regions. In this sense, small shocks can have very large e®ects
if markets are incomplete.
8.3 Alternative Market Structures
The market structure in Figure 1 results in a symmetric allocation because in
either state of nature there is an alternating pattern of liquidity shocks as one
passes around the circle of regions. This is not important for the achievement
of the ¯rst best. In fact, all that is required for the decentralization result
is that the regions be connected. However, the symmetry of the equilibrium
allocation and the conditions for ¯nancial contagion do depend on the sym-
metry of the market structure. To see this, consider the market structure in
Figure 4. In state S1, at date 1, regions A and C are adjacent and have high
shocks and regions B and D are adjacent and have low shocks. In state S1
the shocks are reversed but the same pairing holds. This is not an obstacle
to achieving the ¯rst best, but it does require a special pattern of claims. In
order to satisfy its budget constraint in state S1, region A will have to hold
(!H ¡°) deposits in region C. Region will not be able to spare any liquidity
for region A so it will have to pass region A's demand on to region B, along
with its own demand for !H ¡° deposits. So region C must hold 2(!H ¡°)
deposits in region B. Region B has an excess of (° ¡ !L)c1 = (!H ¡ °)c1
units of consumption that it can o®er region C, so to meet the entire demand
from region C it must have (!¡°) deposits in region D that it can liquidate.
27At the ¯nal date, the pattern is reversed. Now regions B and D are
in need of liquidity and regions A and C must provide it. Region B needs
(° ¡ !L) = (!H ¡ °) deposits in region D, but since region D cannot o®er
any liquidity itself, it must have 2(!H ¡ °) deposits in region A that it can
liquidate in order to provide both for its own needs and those of region B.
Region A needs only (!H ¡°) deposits in region C to pass on part of region
D's demand to region C.
In state S2, regions B and D are in need of liquidity and, by a similar
argument, region B must hold (!H ¡ °) deposits in D, region D must hold
2(!H ¡ °) deposits in A, and region A must hold at least (!H ¡°) in C.
So the equilibrium pattern is for regions C and D to hold 2(!H ¡ °)
in regions B and A, respectively, and for regions B and A to hold at least
(!H ¡ °) in regions D and C, respectively. This pattern will not satisfy
the budget constraint at the ¯rst date, however. The only way that banks
can a®ord deposits in another region is to sell their own deposits. If regions
C and D hold 2(!H ¡ °) deposits in regions B and A, respectively, they
must o®er regions A and B, respectively, the same number of deposits in
their own banks. So the cross-holdings of deposits remains symmetric in the
equilibrium, even though the transfers carried out through the liquidation of
those deposits is not symmetric.
What changes as a result of the bigger deposit holdings is the size of the
spillover e®ect. Consider what happens to region A in state ¹ S. If region A
is bankrupt and region C is not bankrupt, the loss to region D is 2(!H ¡
°)(qA ¡ c1). There are two e®ects. First, region D holds more deposits in
region A and this makes things worse for region D; second, region A holds
more deposits in region C and this increases qA, which makes things better
for region D. Now, putting z = (!H ¡ °),
q
A =
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28so the loss to region D is greater when the size of the deposits is greater.
Thus, contagion gets started more easily when the level of deposits held by
banks is 2z rather than z.
The ¯nal possible market structure is shown in Figure 5. It can straight-
forwardly be seen that this is equivalent to the complete market structure
shown in Figure 1 in states S1 and S2. The reason is that liquidity shocks
in regions A and C are perfectly correlated so that these deposits o®set each
other. Similarly for regions B and D: The level of deposits held to achieve
the e±cient allocation will again be zi = (!H ¡ °)=2: The di®erence comes
in state S. The upper bound on the value of deposits qA is given by (10)
rather than (12) but the condition for contagion is
(z=2)(c1 ¡ q
A) > b(°):
It follows contagion occurs more easily than with the complete market struc-
ture in Figure 1 but less easily than with the market structure in Figure
2.
8.4 Sunspot Equilibria
The focus in this paper is on ¯nancial contagion as an essential feature of
equilibrium. We do not rely on arguments involving multiple equilibria. The
aim is instead to show that under certain conditions every continuation equi-
librium at date 1 exhibits ¯nancial contagion. Nonetheless, there are multiple
equilibria in the model and if one is so disposed one can use the multiplicity
of equilibrium to tell a story about ¯nancial contagion as a sunspot phenom-
enon.
To illustrate the multiplicity as simply as possible, suppose that mar-
kets are complete and the fraction of early consumers in each region is non-
stochastic and equal to °. There are no interregional cross holdings of de-
posits at date 0. If every consumer in every bank chooses to withdraw his
deposit at date 1, regardless of the size of the liquidity shock, then the banks
will all be bankrupt because c1 > y + rx. This outcome is an equilibrium
because it is optimal for each individual depositor to withdraw assuming that
all other depositors withdraw. There is also the usual equilibrium in which
late consumers choose not to withdraw until date 2 and the bank's portfolio
(x;y) allows the ¯rst best to be achieved.
29The low probability event ¹ S is now interpreted as a \sunspot" that does
not change the demand for liquidity but simply triggers the self-ful¯lling
prophecy that a bank run will occur. The outcome in terms of the pattern
of bank runs in state ¹ S is the same as in Section 5. Whether one wants to
call this a contagion is a matter of taste.
8.5 Risky Assets
For simplicity, we have assumed that the long asset has a non-stochastic
return, but it would be more realistic to assume that the long asset is risky.
In Allen and Gale (1998a), the long asset is risky and negative information
about future returns is what triggers bank runs. In the present framework,
uncertainty about long asset returns could be used both to motivate inter-
regional cross holdings of deposits and to provoke insolvency or bankruptcy.
The results should be similar. What is crucial for the results is that the
¯nancial interconnectedness between the regions takes the form of claims
held by banks in one region on banks in another region.
If, instead of holding claims on banks in another regions, banks were to
invest directly in the long assets of that region, there would be a spillover
e®ect, but it would be much weaker. If banks in region A hold some of the
long asset in region B and it has a low return, then the depositors in region
A must accept a reduction in consumption. But that is all. Banks in region
B, who hold a large proportion of their assets in region B, are forced to
liquidate their assets at a much greater loss since r < R. As long as the
banks in region A are not bankrupt, they can a®ord to wait to get the higher
return R > r.
On the other hand, if the banks in region A had invested in the banks in
region B, then they would su®er a larger loss when the banks in region B
liquidate their assets.
Another way that banks can invest indirectly in risky assets is by lend-
ing to investors. If banks cannot observe the investment portfolio chosen
by the investors, the investors will engage in risk shifting. Allen and Gale
(1998b) show that this kind of behavior can lead to bubbles in asset prices
and increase the probability of a banking crisis (general default).
308.6 Alternative Interbank Markets
The fact that the ¯nancial interconnectedness takes the form of pre-existing
claims on other banks is crucial. If liquidity were provided on an ex post
basis, there would be no possibility of contagion. Suppose, for example, that
instead of an interbank market for deposits at the ¯rst date, there is an
interbank for one-period loans at the second date. Then a bank that ¯nds
it has an excess demand for liquidity at date 1 has no pre-existing claim
on banks in other regions, but it can borrow from banks in regions with an
excess supply of liquidity. In states like S1 and S2, this mechanism will be
enough to achieve the ¯rst best. If the lending rate is ½ then the markets
will clear if




In state ¹ S, however, there will be an economy-wide shortage of liquidity. The
fraction of early consumers is ° + " in region A and ° in the other regions;
but there is only enough of the short asset in the economy to provide for
a fraction ° of early consumers. The only way that more liquidity can be
provided to the banks in region A is for the long asset to be liquidated. The
only way that other regions will be willing to do this is if the rate of interest
on loans compensates for the cost of liquidation:




At this rate, the cost of borrowing is too high to be of any help to the banks
in region A. It is just like liquidating more of the long asset and we already
have assumed that the bank is liquidating as much as it can, subject to the
incentive constraint.
So the interbank loan market turns out to be of no use in state ¹ S, where
there is an economy-wide shortage of liquidity. It protects other regions from
contagion, but does nothing to stop the crisis in the a®ected region.
If the probability of state ¹ S is very small but positive, the ex post loan
market is strictly preferred to the ex ante deposit market because region A is
no worse o® and the other regions are better o®. In this very simple model,
there is no advantage to negotiating liquidity contracts ex ante. In a richer
model, there might well be a \hold-up" problem because banks with excess
liquidity can exploit banks with insu±cient liquidity. There could also be an
31adverse selection problem where bad banks are more likely to try to use the
ex post loan market than good banks. These and other problems arising from
asymmetric information could cause banks to prefer negotiating a contract
ex ante. An interesting question is what kinds of arrangements banks will
choose to set up, given the trade-o® between the individual bene¯ts of access
to liquidity and the social costs of contagion. This is an important topic for
further study.
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